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Jones was convicted upon two counts of an information charging
the commission of lewd and lascivious acts upon the person of his nine
year old niece. At the time of the alleged offenses, Carol, the niece, was
living with Jones and his wife. She testified to the conduct of Jones
upon the two occasions specified in the information, "and it clearly was
a violation of the statute." In addition, she testified that Jones indulged
in similar acts "lots of days," and that on one occasion, Jones "showed
her four books containing pornographic pictures and writing" prior
to his lewd and lascivious conduct. "Briefly stated," said the court,
"what Jones did, as related by Carol, amounted to sexual relations
without penetration."
Jones denied having committed any of the acts or having shown
Carol any pornographic books, although he admitted "having had eight
or nine pictures of nude women in his bedroom." Jones and his wife
testified that their sexual relationship was mutually satisfactory but his
mother-in-law "told of complaints by him that his wife did not satisfy
him sexually." There was evidence that Jones had a good reputation
for morality in his community. Mrs. Jones testified that Carol's repu-
tation for truth and veracity was bad.
On appeal, while conceding the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the conviction, Jones claimed error because of the rejection of the
following offer of proof:
At this time, rather than bringing the psychiatrist into court
and having an adverse ruling on what he would testify about, I
would like at this time to make an offer of proof that we will pro-
duce Dr. James Solomon, a duly licensed physician and surgeon
under the laws of California, specializing in psychiatry who is a
graduate of the University of Illinois College of Medicine, who
interned at the Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, Boston Psychopathic
Hospital, residency in neurology in Massachusetts General Hos-
t Professor of Law, University of California School of Law, Berkeley, Cali-
fornia.
t Associate in Law, 1953-4, University of California School of Law, Berkeley,
California.
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pital, assistant in neurology, Harvard University Medical School,
resident staff psychiatrist, Compton Sanitarium, and for the last
six years has devoted full time practice to the field of psychiatry
and neurology, who is a member of the Los Angeles County Medi-
cal Associatipn, California Medical Association, American Medi-
cal Association, Los Angeles Society of Neurology and Psychia-
try, American Psychiatric Association and is a staff physician at
the following: Los Angeles County General Hospital, Cedars of
Lebanon Hospital, Methodist Hospital, Temple Hospital, Midway
Hospital, Mt. Sinai Duarte National Center, Braewood Hospital,
Los Angeles Neurological Institute, Westerly Sanitarium, Alham-
bra Sanitorium, Clear View Sanitarium, Santa Monica Rest
Home, Resthaven Sanitarium, Los Angeles Psychiatric Service,
who is an independent medical examiner for the State Department
of Mental Hygiene and L. A. Psychopathic Court and of the State
Industrial Accident Commission.
If produced as a witness, Dr. Solomon will testify that at my
request he examined Mr. Rayburn Jones on two occasions, one
without the use of drugs and on the second occasion with the aid
of a drug known as sodium pentothal; that as a result of those
examinations he reached the conclusion that Mr. Jones is not a
sexual deviate.. .
The Supreme Court of California (one judge not participating)
unanimously sustained this contention.' Evidence of good character is
relevant "[i]n the determination of the probabilities of guilt"; "the
purpose of the evidence as to the character of the accused is to show his
disposition, and to base thereon a probable presumption that he would
not be likely to commit, and, therefore, did not commit, the crime with
which he is charged"; while "character is proved by evidence of the
accused's general reputation in the community for the traits which are
in issue," the California statute providing for the control of "sexual
psychopaths" states "a legislative determination that such a person is
more likely to violate [the criminal statute in question] than one who
has no such propensity; to some extent there is a cause and effect re-
lationship"; from "evidence which tends to prove that a person is not
a sexual psychopath, an inference reasonably may be drawn that he did
not commit the offense denounced" by the statute; "the competency
of expert opinion in this field of evidence is established by the statutory
procedure for the determination of sexual psychopathy. Accordingly,
the evidence here excluded was relevant to the general issue before the
jury and should have been admitted." And, because "the only direct
evidence is the charges made by Carol and the denials of Jones . .
1. The offer of proof, as quoted, is from the Reporter's Transcript.
2. People v. Jones, 266 P2d 38 (Cal. 1954).
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the exclusion of the psychiatrist's testimony was prejudicially erro-
neous." 3
The holding is plainly a very significant one 4 and presents a num-
ber of interesting and fairly difficult questions.5
1. PROOF OF CHARACTER BY OPINION EVIDENCE
Passing for the moment the difficult question of whether the court
was justified in accepting "expert" testimony touching defendant's dis-
position or propensities, we note first a radical departure from orthodox
doctrine which limits proof of character to reputation evidence. "The
rule is as follows: If evidence of good character is given in behalf of
the prisoner, evidence of bad character may be given in reply; but in
either case the evidence must be confined to the prisoner's general repu-
tation, and the individual opinion of the witness as to his disposition,
founded on his own experience and observation, is inadmissible." 6 As
Mr. Justice Jackson put it in Michelson v. United States: ' "The wit-
3. Id. at 42-3.
4. In the People's "Supplemental Memorandum" in support of the petition for
rehearing, it is said (page 3) : "We do not believe that this court has come to the
conclusion that evidence of character has passed from the crucible of the community
to the couch of the psychiatrist." But the petition was denied and the court's con-
clusion appears to be as characterized in the Memorandum. Accordingly, we have
adopted it as the title of our Article.
5. As will be seen, the scope of this Article is limited. We have not under-
taken an investigation of current scientific thought and findings in respect to the
dependability of psychiatric testimony in the area in question. We leave that to
others better qualified. Our endeavor has been to identify the effects of the decisiori
on the orthodox cluster of legal rules regulating the proof of character in criminal
cases and to survey briefly the implications of the dcision--effects and implications
which the court in the Jones case may or may not have taken into account. The
decision is, of course, of particular importance in California. But it has significance
also in all states which have enacted legislation similar to the California Sexual
Psychopathic Act. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 5500 et seq. (Deering 1952).
Special sex psychopath legislation in other states is discussed in Bowman, Re-
view of Sex Legislation and Control of Sex Offenders in the United States of
America, 20 FINAL REPORT ON CALIFORNIA SExuAL DEVIATION RESEARCH 15 (March
1954), and digested in Bowman and Engle, Synopses of Special Sex Psychopath
Laws-United States, id. at 41. See ALA. CODz ANN. tit. 15, §434 et seq. (Supp.
1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48, §550(1) et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1953);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3501 et seq. (1951) ; ILL. Rmv. STAT. c. 38, § 820 et seq. (1953) ;
IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-3401 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1953); KAN. GEN. STAT.
§ 62-1534 et seq. (Corrick Supp. 1950); MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 123A, § 1
et seq. (1949); MICH. ComP. LAWS § 780.501 et seq. (Mason 1948), as amended,
MICH. ComP. LAWS § 780.501 et seq. (Mason Supp. 1952); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 526.09 et seq. (1947); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.700 et seq. (Vernon 1952); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 29-2901 et seq. (Supp. 1953); N.H. Laws 1949, c. 314, as amended,
N.H. Laws 1953, c. 114; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 164-3 et seq. (1953); N.Y. CODE
CaRm. PRoc. § 659 et seq.; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2188 et seq.; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 13451.19 et seq. (Page Cum. Supp. 1952) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 137.112 et seq. (1953) ;
PA. STAT. ANN. § 1166 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 53-278.2
et seq. (Supp. 1952); Vt. Acts 1951, No. 170, § 438 et seq.; WASH. REv. CODE,
c. 71.06 (1952); WIs. STAT. §§ 340.485, 351.66 (1951); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1953).
6. People v. Gordon, 103 Cal. 568, 573-4, 37 Pac. 534, 535 (1894). See also, 7
WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1980, 1981, 1983 (3d ed. 1940).
7. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
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ness may not testify about defendant's . . . possession of a particular
disposition or of benign mental or moral traits . ... ," 8
In justification of the departure from existing doctrine the Cali-
fornia court has only this to say:
"These statutory provisions [the Sexual Psychopathic Law] con-
cerning those who commit sex offenses clearly state a legislative
determination that such a person is more likely to violate section
288 than one who has no such propensity; to some extent there
is a cause and effect relationship. Evidence that a person has no
such disposition is analogous to that in regard to character, for it
bears upon the probability of the innocence of the accused. From
evidence which tends to prove that a person is not a sexual psycho-
path, an inference reasonably may be drawn that he did not com-
mit the act denounced by section 288. . . . The competency of
expert opinion in this field of evidence is established by the statu-
tory procedure for the determination of sexual psychopathy." 9
But it is very difficult to see how the provisions of this act, which
by its terms, is not operative until after conviction of the criminal of-
fense, can be said to manifest a legislative intention to abrogate a rule of
evidence of long standing which is applicable in the trial of the criminal
action. The salient features of the Sexual Psychopathic Act are sum-
8. Id. at 477. More at length, Justice Jackson discussed the rule as follows:
"When the defendant elects to initiate a character inquiry, another anomalous
rule comes into play. Not only is he permitted to call witnesses to testify from
hearsay, but indeed such a witness is not allowed to base his testimony on any-
thing but hearsay. What commonly is called 'character evidence' is only such
when 'character' is employed as a synonym for 'reputation. The witness may
not testify about defendant's specific acts or courses of conduct or his possession
of a particular disposition or of benign mental and moral traits; nor can he
testify that his own acquaintance, observation, and knowledge of defendant leads
to his own independent opinion that defendant possesses a good general or
specific character, inconsistent with commission of acts charged. The witness
is however, allowed to summarize what he has heard in the community, although
much of it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself.
The evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of defendant
but only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his neighborhood. This has
been well described in a different connection as 'the slow growth of months and
years, the resultant picture of forgotten incidents, passing events, habitual
and daily conduct, presumably honest because disinterested, and safer to be
trusted because prone to suspect. . . . It is for that reason that such general
repute is permitted to be proven. It sums up a multitude of trivial details. It
compacts into the brief phrase of a verdict the teaching of many incidents and the
conduct of years. It is the average intelligence drawings its conclusion. Finch,
J., in Badger v. Badger, 88 N.Y. 546, 552.
'While courts have recognized logical grounds for criticism of this type of
opinion-based-on-hearsay testimony, it is said to be justified by 'overwhelming
considerations of practical convenience' in avoiding innumerable collateral issues
which, if it were attempted to prove character by direct testimony, would com-
plicate and confuse the trial, distract the minds of jurymen and befog the chief
issues in the litigation. People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 419, 82 N.E. 718,
721."
9. People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38, 42 (Cal. 1954).
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marized in the margin."0 It is sufficient for the text merely to note
that the Act is applicable only after conviction of a criminal offense;
that after conviction the court may, and in some cases must, certify to
the Superior Court the question whether the accused is a "sexual psy-
chopath"; and that, in aid of this determination, the latter court is
directed to appoint at least two and not more than three psychiatrists,
whose function it is "to make a personal examination of the alleged
sexual psychopath, directed toward ascertaining whether the person is"
10. A sexual psychopath is defined as one "who is affected, in a form predis-
posing to the commission of sexual offenses, and in a degree constituting him a
menace to the health or safety of others, with any of the following conditions:
(a) Mental disease or disorder. (b) Psychopathic personality. (c) Marked de-
partures from normal mentality." CAL. WFz.. & INsT. CoDE § 5500 (Deering 1952).
"When a person is convicted of any criminal offense, whether or not a sex offense,
the trial judge, . . . if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that there is
probable cause for believing such person is a sexual psychopath . . . , may adjourn
the proceeding or suspend the sentence . . . and certify the person for hearing and
examination by the superior court . . . to determine whether the person is a sexual
psychopath. . . ." Id. § 5501(a). This procedure is mandatory in the case of one
convicted of a sex offense involving a child under 14 years of age, if the offense is a
felony or if the defendant has been previously convicted of any sex offense. Id.
§ 5501 (b). The defendant is to be informed of the nature of the proceeding and of his
rights to make a reply and to produce witnesses. The hearing and examination shall be
held in open court. Id. § 5503. The court is required to refer the matter to the
probation officer, "to investigate and report to the court within a specified time, upon
the circumstances surrounding the crime and the prior record and history of the
person." The report shall include the criminal record, if any, of the person to be
obtained from the State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation. The
probation officer's report goes not only to the court but as well to each psychiatrist
appointed by the court. Id. § 5503.5. Not less than two nor more than three
qualified psychiatrists are to be appointed. Their function is "to make a personal
examination of the alleged sexual psychopath, directed toward ascertaining whether
the person is a sexual psychopath." Id. § 5504. Each psychiatrist is required to
file with the court a separate written report, together with his conclusions and
recommendations. And "at the hearing each psychiatrist shall hear the testimony of
all witnesses, and shall testify as to the result of his examination, and to any other
pertinent facts within his knowledge." Id. § 5505. Any psychiatrist so appointed
by the court may be called by either party or by the court and "when so called shall
be subject to all legal objections as to competency and bias and as to qualification
as an expert." Id. § 5506. Either party may call other experts and the judge shall
cause to be examined as a witness any other person whom he believes to have
knowledge "of the mental condition" of the subject or of his financial condition or
that of any person liable for his support. Id. § 5509. If, upon the hearing, the
person is found to be a sexual psychopath, the court shall return him to the court
in which the case originated "for such disposition as that court may deem neces-
sary and proper." Id. § 5511.7. If the person is found to be a sexual psychopath,
he shall be committed to a county or state hospital for a period of not to exceed
90 days for "observation and diagnosis." Within 90 days, the superintendent of the
hospital shall cause the person to be examined and shall forward to the court his
opinion as to whether the person is a sexual psychopath, whether he is a menace to
the health and safety of others and whether he will benefit by care and treatment in
a state hospital. If the superintendent reports that the person is not a sexual psycho-
path or that he is such but would not benefit by care and treatment in a state hos-
pital, he is to be returned to the court in which the criminal charge was tried to
await action thereon. If the superintendent reports that the person is a sexual
psychopath and would benefit by treatment, a further hearing shall be arranged, at
which the court may commit the person to a state hospital for an indeterminate
period. Id. § 5512.3. Provision is then made for periodic reports on the person's
progress, further hearings based on such reports and further appropriate action by
the court. Id. § 5514.
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such, and each of whom is required to file with the court "a written
report, together with his conclusions and recommendations."
It is to be observed that the statute is clear to the effect that af any
stage of the rather complex procedure, if it appears that the subject is
not a sexual psychopath, he is to be returned to the criminal court for
normal action based on the conviction. In other words the post-con-
viction opinion of the psychiatrists and findings of the court supervising
the special statutory procedure that the subject is not a sexual psycho-
path result in allowing the criminal law to take its normal course. How
these provisions evince a legislative design to vary the traditional rules
of evidence in the criminal trial so as to allow psychiatric opinion that
the accused is possessed of benign propensities is very difficult to see.
It seems fair to assume that had the legislature intended such a radical
change in traditional doctrine it would have made that intention ade-
quately evident.
While the traditional California rule limiting proof of character
of the accused to reputation evidence rests entirely on judicial decision,
it is appropriate to observe that the analogous limitation on proof of
character to impeach a witness has a statutory basis. Sections 2051
and 2052 of the Code of Civil Procedure (applicable to criminal as well
as to civil trials ') specify in detail the permissible methods of im-
peachment. In the first of these sections it is provided that "[a] wit-
ness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called,
by evidence.that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity
is bad, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the record of the
judgment, that he had been convicted of a felony. . . ." 1 These pro-
visions as drawn and interpreted,' 8 leave no room for the admission of
opinion evidence of character. In view of the parallel development of
the rules excluding opinion of traits of character of a witness and those
of an accused,14 and the similarity, if not identity, of applicable policy
considerations, it is suggested that the California court, in the Jones
case did not give adequate consideration to the legislative policy im-
bedded in the impeachment provisions nor to the basic anomaly of a
judicial departure from what Wigmore calls one branch 15 of the ortho-
11. CAr.. PEN. CODE § 1102 (Deering 1949).
12. CAr. CODE OF Civ. PRoc. § 2051 (Deering 1953). Section 2052 provides for
impeachment by prior inconsistent statements.
13. The methods prescribed in the code for the impeachment of a witness are
exclusive. See People v. Harlan, 133 Cal. 16, 20, 65 Pac. 9, 10 (1901) ; People v.
Holman, 72 Cal. App. 2d 75, 97, 164 P.2d 297, 309 (1945).
14. See 7 WGOmR, EVIDENCE §§ 1983, 1985 (3d ed. 1940).
15. Id. § 1983.
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dox American rule when it is quite clear that the impeachment statutes
forbid a similar relaxation of the other branch.
In the second Hiss trial,' Judge Goddard admitted psychiatric
testimony to the effect that the chief prosecution witness "was a psych6-
path with a tendency toward making false accusations," a holding
which has provoked considerable debate." But such a holding would
appear to be precluded in California under the statutory provisions re-
ferred to.
So much for technical difficulties. What about the merits and
implications of the Jones decision? Wigmore, of course, is critical of
the latter-day rule which restricts proof of character to reputation evi-
dence. "The Anglo-American rules of evidence have occasionally
taken some curious twistings in the course of their development," he
says, "but they have never done anything so curious in the way of shut-
ting out evidential light as when they decided to exclude the person
who knows as much as humanly can be known about the character of
another, and have still admitted the secondhand, irresponsible product
of multiplied guesses and gossip which we term reputation." " But he
makes it very clear that by the testimony of the "person who knows as
much as humanly can be known about the character of another" he
means " 'the warm affectionate testimony' of those few whose long inti-
macy and trust has made them ready to demonstrate their faith to the
jury. . . ." Put yourself in the place of a juryman, he suggests, and
speculate whether you would be helped more "by the witnesses whose
personal intimacy gives to their belief a first and highest value, or by
those who merely repeat a form of words in which the term 'reputation'
occurs. Look at it from the standpoint of the prosecution . . and
then decide whether the witness [excluded in Regina v. Rowton],'"
was not, if believed, worth more than forty opposing witnesses testify-
ing to that intangible, untestable creation called 'reputation'." One
can agree with Wigmore that "a perusal of the records of State trials
will show how natural, straightforward, and useful was this method of
asking after belief founded on personal experience for intimacy," 2 and
16. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see 1950 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AmEaICAx LAW 804 (1951).
17. See 1950 ANNUAL SURVEY oF AmERICAN LAW 804 (1951); Comment, 30
Nm. L. Ray. 513 (1951).
18. 7 WiGOmRE, EVIoENCE § 1986, at 167 (3d ed. 1940).
19. 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 25 (1865). This was a prosecution for indecent assault
upon a boy; the witness for the prosecution was asked, "What is the defendant's
general character for decency and morality of conduct?", and answered: "I know
nothing of the neighborhood's opinion, because I was only a boy at school when I
knew him; but my own opinion and the opinion of my brothers who were also pupils
of his is that his character is that of a man capable of the grossest indecency and
the most flagrant immorality." Id. at 28.
20. 7 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1986, at 166-7 (3d ed. 1940) (italics added).
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yet be skeptical of extending the relaxation so as to permit the opinion
of a psychiatrist based on nothing more than an interview or two, or as
was the case in the Hiss trial, on observation of courtroom demeanor
and assumptions in a hypothetical question, without any clinical exam-
ination whatever.
It is to be noted that both the Model Code of Evidence 2' and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence 2 would allow not only reputation evi-
dence but as well opinion evidence as to the character of the accused
in a criminal action. While the comment of the draftsman in neither
case throws any light upon the considerations which prompted this pro-
posed change in existing law, it seems a justifiable conclusion that it
is traceable to Wigmore's quite persuasive strictures on the existing
rule and might well be interpreted accordingly. It is true that the
Model Code provision specifically states that "a witness may state his
opinion under Rules 401-409," " this reference being to the rules reg-
ulating the reception of opinion testimony, both lay and expert. But
this falls short, we believe, of a persuasive indication of an intention
to open the door to psychiatric testimony in the Jones situation.
Rather, the language employed appears calculated to make it clear that
the opinion rule as such should not operate to exclude the belief of a
character witness whose conclusions as to the accused's character are
based on personal acquaintance. As Wigmore observes,2 4 the opinion
rule should yield here, since the witness, by the nature of the case, will
manifestly be unable to reproduce, in words, the minutiae of the ac-
cused's conduct ("every incident and act indicative of character") upon
which his opinion depends.
2. Is THIs A PROPER SUBJECT OF EXPERT TESTIMONY?
So far as his qualifications as an expert psychiatrist are concerned,
there can seem to have been no question in the Jones case as to the
witness' competency. But there remains the more basic question: Is
psychiatry competent to measure propensity on the basis of two con-
sultations or interviews? The offer of proof does not touch the prob-
lem. An independent examination of the record discloses no showing
of scientific recognition of the ability of psychiatry to perform this
feat. Nor was the trial court's attention directed to any scientific lit-
erature on the subject. Likewise, the opinion of the Supreme Court
contains no indication that that tribunal made any investigation of the
21. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 306 (1942).
22. UNIFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rules 46, 47 (1953).
23. MODEL CODE OF EVIDEN CE, Rule 305(2) (1942).
24. 7 Wi~mom, EVIDENCE § 1986, at 166 (3d ed. 1940).
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matter. It is obviously beyond the competence of the writers of this
Article to appraise the ability of the psychiatrist to fathom the mind
and heart of an accused on the basis of two consultations, and we doubt
that judges are in any better position to do so. Thus, it would appear
that there should have been required some preliminary showing of
scientific acceptance of the dependability of the doctor's conclusions in
the circumstances of this case.' All that we have here is an offer to
show that a qualified psychiatrist is of the opinion that Jones "is not a
sexual deviate." If, .without more, this is to be received it seems to
mean that the opinion of any "expert" is to be received on any subject
related to his profession, whether or not his colleagues, taking account
of the learning and findings of the discipline, deem the opinion so far
error-proof as to entitle it to be accepted as the rational basis for im-
portant action. It is, of course, this absence of adequate scientific rec-
ognition and consequent doubt of dependability which explain the uni-
form current of judicial decision rejecting results of lie detector tests,26
"truth-serum" tests 27 and the early decisions excluding results of
drunkometer tests.
2 8
The only answer to the foregoing provided by the opinion in the
Jones case is this single sentence: "The competency of expert opinion
in this field of evidence is established by the statutory procedure for
the determination of sexual psychopathy." 29 But, as pointed out, all
this act "establishes" is the propriety of taking psychiatric opinion in
a unique post-conviction procedure, which the court has characterized
25. "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs." Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
26. See 1950 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 814 (1951); 1952 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 727 (1952).
27. 1952 ANNUAL SmvEY OF AMERICAN LAW 727 (1952). In rejecting evidence
of defendant's denials of guilt while under the influence of "truth-telling serum," the
Missouri Supreme Court said in 1926: "Testimony of this character-barring the
sufficient fact that it cannot be otherwise classified than as a self-serving declaration-
is, in the present state of human knowledge, unworthy of serious consideration. We
are not told from what well this serum is drawn or in what alembic its alleged truth-
compelling powers are distilled. Its origin is as nebulous as its effect is uncertain.
A belief in its potency, if it has any existence, is confined to the modern Cagliostros,
who still, as Balsamo did of old, cozen the credulous for a quid pro quo, by inducing
them to believe in the magic powers of philters, potions and cures by faith. The trial
court therefore, whether it assigned a reason for its action or not, ruled correctly
in excluding this clap-trap from the consideration of the jury." State v. Hudson,
289 S.W. 920, 921 (Mo. 1926).
28. See 1950 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 816 (1951); 1951 ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 853 (1952) ; 1952 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
727 (1952).
29. People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38, 42 (Cal. 1954).
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as being "civil in nature rather than penal." " It is taking a giant step
to conclude from this that the legislature has "established" the depend-
ability of psychiatric opinion of propensity on the issue, in the criminal
case, of guilt of the specific offense. It is to be noted also that the
Sexual Psychopath Act requires that there be furnished to each psychia-
trist the probation officer's report which is to include "the circum-
stances surrounding the crime and the prior record and history" of the
defendant, as well as his criminal record.3 Also, he is required to
listen to "the testimony of all witnesses" at the psychopathic hearing.3 2
So that, in any case, the provisions of the act miss by a considerable
margin a legislative determination that psychiatric opinion based on
examination alone is acceptable. Finally, it is to be observed that the
offer in the Jones case was the testimony of the psychiatrist that Jones
was not a "sexual deviate." The statute upon which the court relies
has to do with "sexual psycopaths," defined in the act with some pre-
cision.' Whether a "sexual deviate," as the proposed witness would
have used the expression and as the jury would have understood it, is
included in the statutory definition of "sexual psychopath" is not de-
terminable from the opinion or the record in the case.
The full implications of the court's decision are apparent from its
explicit disapproval of People v. Sellers, 4 a 1951 decision of the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal. Charged with sexual perversion, an act with
another male, defendant offered and there was received evidence that
"his reputation in the community for morality, chastity, and nonhomo-
sexuality was good." 3' He also offered, but the trial court rejected,
the opinion of a physician specializing in neurology and psychiatry that
defendant was not a homosexual. The conviction was affirmed by the
District Court of Appeal. In disapproving this holding, the Supreme
Court in the Jones opinion says: "The reasoning of that case over-
looks the accepted fact that homosexual acts of the nature there consid-
ered constitute abnormal conduct indulged in by persons with a pro-
pensity for it; normal individuals ordinarily do not resort to such acts,
hence a showing of sexual normality in that respect has relevancy to the
nonperformance of homosexual acts." " This is very persuasive of the
relevancy of character evidence; but it offers nothing on the question
30. See People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 346, 246 P.2d 913, 918 (1952);
cf. In re Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 240, 85 A.2d 371, 372 (1952).
31. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5503.5 (Deering 1952).
32. Id. § 5505.
33. Id. § 5501.
34. 103 Cal. App. 2d 830, 230 P.2d 398 (1951).
35. Id. at 831, 230 P.2d at 399.
36. People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38, 43 (Cal. 1954).
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of whether proof of character should be limited to reputation evidence
and, more important, it does not reach the matter of the necessity of
some showing of scientific recognition of the dependability of psychi-
atric opinion as to whether one is or is not a "homosexual."
While the decision in the Jones case appears bottomed entirely on
what the court conceives to be a legislative recognition of the admis-
sibility of this type of psychiatric testimony, and thus it is perhaps not
justifiable to project the applicability of the rule of the case to prosecu-
tions for other than sexual offenses, still, on principle, it seems difficult
to see why, on the same general reasoning, psychiatric testimony as to
lack of propensity ought not be equally admissible in any type of pros-
ecution. What, for example, does the Jones decision presage for a
future situation like that in People v. Villegas? 17 Villegas, with an-
other, was charged with robbery. The defense was that Villegas com-
mitted the acts upon which the charge was based under coercion of his
co-defendant. He called a "psychologist" and offered to prove by her
that she had known Villegas for 14 years, and that by reason of her
study of psychology "she was in a position to testify that [defendant's]
will power was weak, that his physical condition was bad, and that he
therefore was without sufficient force to 'resist the impulse of this other
boy to take him out on these robberies'." 3s In affirming the action of
the trial court rejecting this offer, the District Court of Appeal said
that the offered testimony was incompetent and immaterial. "[S]he
was entitled only to testify, as she was permitted under the court's ruling
to do, concerning the general reputation of the [defendant] in the com-
munity in which he lived for the traits involved in the offenses
charged.""
And if expert opinion is to be received that defendant is not a
"sexual deviate" or a "homosexual," on what principle may there be
excluded psychiatric opinion that he is not a "thief," a "robber" or a
"murderer" ?
3. THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IN REBUTTAL
While, of course, the prosecution is not permitted to open up the
character question, it is elementary law that, if defendant offers evi-
dence of good character as making guilt less likely, the prosecution in
rebuttal may offer evidence of bad character.4' The holding in the
Jones case thus seems to mean that wherever in a sexual case the de-
37. 29 Cal. App. 2d 658, 85 P.2d 480 (1938).
38. Id. at 663, 85 P.2d at 482.
39. Ibid.
40. 1 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 58 (3d ed. 1940) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule
306 (1942); UNmFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 47 (1953).
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fendant opens up the question of his character by reputation evidence,
psychiatric opinion evidence or otherwise, the prosecution may, in re-
buttal, introduce the testimony of qualified psychiatrists that in their
opinion defendant is a "sexual psychopath," a "sexual deviate," a "ho-
mosexual," a "sexual pervert," etc.4 ' In other words, the rule should
work both ways. There arises here what seems to be a fairly difficult
semantic problem as to the precise meaning of characterizations
such as those just suggested. When, for the defendant, the psychiatrist
testifies that he is "not a sexual deviate," what does he mean or how
will the jury understand him? That he has no desire to "deviate"?
Or merely that he has never "deviated"? And, if to meet this, the
prosecution, in rebuttal offers psychiatric opinion that defendant is a
"sexual deviate," how will the jury.take this? That he has actually
"deviated"? Or merely that he has a black heart but with no implica-
tion that he has ever yielded? The question is important because
orthodox doctrine, apparently deemed unobjectionable by authoritative
commentators, forbids proof of character, not in issue, by specific in-
stances of good or bad conduct.42 Accordingly, unless this rule is also
to be thrown overboard, care must be exercised in applying the Jones
rule to see to it that the experts, on both sides, are testifying merely
to traits, not to conduct, and that their interrogation proceeds in such
a manner and the jury be so instructed as to insure, as far as possible,
against leaving the impression that the accused has or has not actually
"deviated."
4. ADMIsSIBILITY OF RESULTS OF "TRUTH SERUM" TESTS
It will be recalled that one of the two examinations of Jones by
the psychiatrist was accomplished with the aid of a drug known as
sodium pentothol. It was one of the contentions of the prosecution on
appeal that the testimony of the psychiatrist was inadmissible "because
it was inextricably interwoven with the use of the drug." The court
said this contention was without merit. "Although the attorney general
properly points out that it is questionable whether the results of exam-
inations made while a person is subject to the 'truth drugs' are admis-
able in evidence . . . that conclusion is correct only if the statements
are offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter asserted.
41. The Model Code of Evidence (Rule 306) and the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence (Rule 47) would permit, as does the New York statute (N.Y. CODE Cram.
PRoc. § 393-c), the prosecution, in rebuttal, to show bad character not only by repu-
tation and opinion evidence but as well by evidence of defendant's conviction of a
crime.
42. 3 WIGmORE, EvmmcE § 979 (3d ed. 1940). See also MODEL CODE OF Evi-
DENcE, Rule 306 (1942); UNIFORM RuLES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 47 (1953).
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. Here, the proffered evidence was not the answers of Jones to
certain questions, but the interrogator's expert analysis of those an-
swers for the purpose of determining whether Jones was a sexual de-
viate. . . . Jones' responses were the means to an end, the end being
proof of the fact that Jones was not a sexual deviate." '
Whatever the theory, this appears to be the first decision of any
appellate court 44 sanctioning the admissibility of the results of "truth
serum" tests and is thus of considerable significance for this reason
also. It is to be emphasized that neither in the offer of proof under
consideration nor otherwise was any showing made of scientific recog-
nition of the dependability of the results of this type of experiment.
Nor does the opinion disclose any independent investigation by the
court of the pertinent scientific findings. The New Mexico Supreme
Court, in a recent decision,45 after what appears to have been a careful
study of the pertinent medical literature, held that evidence of the re-
sults of a sodium pentothol test was properly excluded, saying:
"Until the use of the drug as a means of procuring the truth from
people under its influence is accorded general scientific recognition, we
are unwilling to enlarge the already immense field where medical ex-
perts, apparently equally qualified, express such diametrically opposite
views on the same facts and conditions, to the despair of the court
reporter and the bewilderment of the fact finder." 4
The problem of scientific dependability would seem to be present
whether or not the statements of the suspect are directly offered for
assertive use by the tribunal. Even where not, and the testimony is
in form merely the opinion of the expert, it is evident he is basing his
opinion upon an assumption of the truth of what the suspect said while
under the influence of the drugs. Indeed, the test would appear to
have no efficacy whatever unless the statements of the suspect are ac-
43. People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38, 43 (Cal. 1954). But cf. People v. McNichol,
100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P.2d 21 (1950). There the defendant, charged with forging
checks, testified that he had consumed a pint of whiskey and four cans of beer the
morning of the alleged offense and had no recollection of what he had done. One
Singer, a clinical psychologist, was permitted to testify, in response to hypothetical
questions, that one who had consumed this amount of liquor "would not be conscious
of an intent to do an act to obtain money-that his intent would not be a conscious
intent." But the trial court refused to admit evidence of statements made by de-
fendant while under the influence of sodium pentothol administered by Singer. On
appeal defendant contended, inter alia, that his statements while under the influence
of the drug should have been admitted "to show the facts upon which Mr. Singer
based his opinions." But the court held otherwise. "How any statements made by
defendant during the imposed hypnotic state would have served to show facts upon
which he based his replies to the hypothetical questions, or any facts at all, is not
made apparent" Id. at 558, 224 P.2d at 24.
44. See 1952 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 728 (1952).
45. State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952).
46. Id. at 273-4, 243 P.2d at 336.
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cepted, at least by the "interpreter," more or less at face value. In
other words, the supposed utility of these drugs depends, as Wigmore
puts it, "upon the expedient of suppressing temporarily the normal
waking consciousness and producing a narration which recites the in-
terior record of the original perception and recollection." While the
use of this expedient would not reveal errors of original perception or
of original recollection, it would,,continues Wigrnore, "eliminate errors
due to conscious distortion or involuntary perturbation during the later
stage, viz. narration." 17 The matter of scientific recognition cannot
be brushed aside merely because the jury is not to get verbatim and
directly what the suspect said while under the influence of the drug.
One more word on this phase of the case. While it is true that in
some of the previous decisions which have excluded results of truth-
serum tests it appeared that the narration of the suspect was being
offered assertively,4" it is not clear that such was the case in all of them.
Thus, in the New Mexico case 49 the defendant offered to show that the
psychiatrist "questioned him on many points, and as a result of this
examination it became very clear that the defendant not only did not
kill Lucille Ramirez, but that the confessions he made were false, and
that he told a true and accurate story of his connection with the case
which was identical in all respects to the story he told on the witness
stand." Both the trial and appellate courts held the evidence objec-
tionable, not because it amounted to an attempt by the accused to prove
self-serving hearsay, but "on the ground that such tests were not re-
liable or generally approved and accepted by the members of the medi-
cal profession specializing in psychiatry." "
In sum, then, the Jones case appears to stand for the proposition
that the results of a truth-serum test in the form of the opinion of the
interrogator, are admissible; and this without any showing of scientific
recognition of dependability.
5. A BRIEF WORD IN CONCLUSION
In what is unquestionably one of the most careful and compre-
hensive judicial discussions of the rules touching proof of character in
criminal cases," Mr. Justice Jackson has said that while "much of this
law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations
by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly rea-
47. 3 WIGORE, EVIDENcE § 998, at 642 (3d ed. 1940).
48. State v. Hudson, 289 S.W. 920 (Mo. 1926) (see note 26 supra); People v.
McNichol, 100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P.2d 21 (1950) (see note 42 .rpra); Orange v.
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950) (semble).
49. State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 243 P.2d 325 (1952) (see text at note
44 supra).
50. Id. at 271, 243 P.2d at 334.
51. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948) (see notes 6, 7 supra).
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soned counter-privilege to the other . . somehow it has proved a
workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary con-
trols in the hands of a wise and strong trial court. To pull one mis-
shapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to
upset its rational balance between adverse interests than to establish a
rational edifice?' These observations appear as applicable to the prob-
lem in the Jones case as to the question which was under consideration
in Michelson. Enough has been said to make it reasonably clear, we
believe, that before any one of the cluster of the traditional rules regu-
lating proof of character in criminal cases is scuttled, however archaic
or clumsy that rule may appear in a present-day context, careful atten-
tion should be given to the full implications of such a determination
and its effect upon kindred doctrine. In a number of particulars, the
holding in the Jones case may easily turn out to be of a seismic char-
acter.
Certainly not the least significant result of this decision is the
obvious expansion of the area of conflicting expert testimony. Even in
the case of strictly medical testimony, where the issue concerns physical
rather than mental or psychological condition or disability-"objec-
tive" rather than "subjective" symptoms--experience has demonstrated
the commonness of disagreement among the "experts." When the
inquiry is centered on an intangible, impalpable, wholly subjective thing
like state of mind, personality or "propensity," the likelihood of dis-
agreement is greatly enhanced. Thus there is point to the conclusion
of the New Mexico court to the effect that it was "unwilling to enlarge
the already immense field where medical experts, apparently equally
qualified, express such diametrically opposite views on the same facts
and conditions," to the "bewilderment of the fact finder." 5 Indeed,
the California Supreme Court itself, in the recent case of People v.
Cullen," voiced the same apprehension when, in dealing with an offer
of proof based on a sodium pentothol test, it observed that such evi-
dence would be "conjectural since the truth thereof would depend en-
tirely on the psychiatrist's opinion which conceivably might conflict
with the opinion of another psychiatrist." "
52. State v. Lindemuth, 56 N.M. 257, 274, 243 P.2d 325, 336 (1952).
53. 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951).
54. Id. at 626-7, 234 P.2d at 8. In his argument in support of the petition for
rehearing in the Jones case, the attorney general said: "The performances now put
on in the trial of cases involving the issue of sanity do little credit to the legal and
medical professions. . . . Now it is proposed to introduce similar procedures into
every case involving sex and the credibility of witnesses. The endless hypothetical
question and the garrulous answer will be the order of the day." Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Application for Rehearing, p. 3. In its decision affirming
the conviction in the Jones case, the District Court of Appeal said: "To transfer the
determination of the guilt or innocence of those charged with such offenses to the
psychiatrists would be a definite menace to law enforcement and the protection of
society." People v. Jones, 255 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1953).
